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Pioneers of the plantation economy: 
militarism, dispossession and the limits 
of growth in the Wa State of Myanmar
The characteristic mobility of highland populations in Southeast Asia relied to a large extent on their partic-
ular adaption to an ecological environment: swidden cultivation of tubers on mountain slopes. This ecology 
corresponded to cosmologies in which potency was limitless, or at least had no fixed and delimited precinct 
(as did the rice paddies and Buddhist realms in the valleys). Military state building, modern transport, and 
new crops and agricultural technologies have effectively ended swidden cultivation. In this article, I follow 
the pioneers of the plantation economy in the Wa State of Myanmar, who dispossess local populations of 
their land and employ them as plantation labour. The limits of growth and potency they encounter are (a) in 
the natural environment and (b) in the resistance of local populations. Yet, even though there are such limits, 
the potency to which these pioneers aspire is still limitless. It is however channelled through a new economy 
of life, epitomised in the plantation, nourished in excessive feasting, and maintained by the kinship dynamics 
of capture and care.
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I n t r o d u c t i o n
A classic origin story told and retold among the Wa of China and Myanmar is 
about their flight from Keng Tung: in the long‐ ago past, the Wa ruled over the Shan in 
the great city of Keng Tung.1 But they were tricked by the Shan, who came with an 
army of elephants and expelled them from the city. Those who went ahead broke plan-
tain leaves along their path so that those coming behind would find the way. But plan-
tains grow back very fast, and the latecomers got lost and had to stay in the plains: the 
Wa pioneers entered the mountains where they are until today, and the others are the 
‘left‐ behind Wa’, the Wa Git, or the ‘Hill Thai’, Tai Loi. From then on, every time a 
new Sawbwa was installed in Keng Tung, some left‐ behind Wa were feasted at the pal-
ace and then ritually expelled (Enriquez 1918: 33; Mangrai 1981: 230). Today, the Shan 
of Kengtung recognise their Burmese overlords and have no Sawbwa anymore, but the 
Tai Loi, the descendants of the Wa, still play an important part in the rituals of Songkran, 
the Thai New Year Festival, specifically by carrying and playing drums. Even though 
the rituals imply mutual interdependence, it is clear that the Tai Loi subordinate them-
selves to the Tai Khuen, the Shan majority group in today’s Keng Tung, thus annually 
repeating the humiliation of their expulsion centuries ago (Karlsson 2013).
Yet, about 100 km to the North of Keng Tung, in Pang Hsang, the capital of the Wa 
State, we can observe an inversion of the ritual of expulsion. Each year at the Songkran of 
Pang Hsang, Wa rulers receive gifts from local Shan villagers. Similar to the Shan princes 
1 This article is based on 18 months of fieldwork in the Wa hills of Myanmar and China during four 
fieldtrips between June 2014 and November 2017. The names of smaller places and ordinary people 
have been anonymised, following anthropological convention.
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of the past, representatives of the Wa central authorities sit in elevated thrones, while 
the Shan villagers squat in front of them. During the rituals, the Shan villagers pay their 
honours to the Wa, deliver presents to them, including fruits, sweets and sticky rice, and 
in turn receive red envelopes with money from the Wa officials. Most of the leaders of 
the Wa State are from villages in the hills to the North of Pang Hsang and can easily be 
distinguished from their Shan subordinates: dark‐ skinned and in army fatigues, followed 
by an entourage of soldiers, no one would mistake them for a Shan villager.
The core leaders of the Wa State are relatives and associates of Tax Pang, also 
known by his Chinese name Bao Youxiang. Tax Pang, and his brothers Tax Rang and 
Tax Jiet, were born in the village of Taoh Mie in the 1940s and 50s. When they were 
children, neighbouring armies had just started to move into the Wa hills, and as teen-
agers they still took part in raids and headhunting rituals. They rose through the ranks 
of the guerrilla armies of the Communist Party of Burma during the 1970s and 80s, 
founded the United Wa State Army (UWSA) in 1989, and have been presiding over its 
de‐ facto state since. Like Tax Pang and his brothers, most members of the central com-
mittee and politburo of the Wa State are veterans of the Communist Party of Burma. 
All of them have accumulated substantial personal wealth – bureaucracy and adminis-
tration is relatively weak, and most infrastructure construction in the Wa State is paid 
for directly by the elites. The trade in drugs played an important role in the emergence 
of this elite, but already in the 1990s, they started to diversify into other industries, 
including mining and food, as well as large‐ scale investments in China, Thailand and 
Myanmar (where they own, for instance, one minor airline). Ordinary villagers and 
Chinese traders often tell stories about the unimaginable wealth of the Wa command-
ers: for instance, one commander had so much cash stored in his warehouses that it got 
mouldy and had to be taken out. His servants dried truckloads of 100‐ Yuan batches 
in the huge courtyard for several days, just like other people would dry corn cobs or 
tea leaves. Wa villagers who have served in the army or at the house of a commander 
commonly know that a normal 50 kg rice‐ bag can carry three million Chinese yuan 
(the equivalent of € 380,000). In the warehouse of one Wa commander I have seen two 
Bentleys, and in one of Pang Hsang’s large garages, a monster truck imported from 
Thailand that is said to be worth exactly one rice bag full of Chinese money.
The elites of the Wa State have effectively turned around the old story of the Wa’s 
expulsion from the highlands and have re‐ conquered the lowlands. During the 1970s and 
80s, when they fought with the Communist Party of Burma, Wa soldiers entered the 
plains of Pang Hsang, Meng Pok and Meng Yawn – traditionally settlements of their Shan 
neighbours. Since then, the Wa have established a de facto state the size of Belgium, and 
the core leaders of this state are tightly connected through kinship and business ties. Most 
of them have grown up in villages at the Chinese border. In their lifetime, they saw huge 
changes: they have conquered the surrounding valleys and since then have also overseen 
huge changes to the villages in the hills, where they had grown up. They started off, quite 
literally, as pioneers, that is, foot soldiers,2 in the Communist Party of Burma. Even 
though the first generation of Wa leaders rose through the ranks of the army and have 
become agrarian capitalists, they still define themselves by a pioneering ethos that will 
become apparent. They have been pioneers in many ways, but here I want to focus on the 
plantation economies that they have established in the Wa State. Using their income from 
2 The etymology of the English word ‘pioneer’ goes back to Old French ‘peonier’, ‘foot‐ soldier’, cf. 
https://www.merri am‐ webst er.com/dicti onary/ pioneer
PIONEERS OF  THE  PLANTAT ION ECONOMY    3
© 2021 The Author. Social Anthropology published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of European Association of Social Anthropologists.
elsewhere, the elites of the Wa State have invested in new forms of commercial and large‐ 
scale agriculture. The rubber and tea plantations they have opened rely on the new tech-
nologies of transport, communication and production that in the Wa hills were introduced 
for military purposes. The plantations also required large‐ scale forced resettlements, 
which took place especially during the 1990s but continue until the present day. The plan-
tation economy requires a lot of investment, it often incurs losses (especially rubber, in 
recent years) and is generally not very profitable. But even so, it is an essential part of the 
de facto sovereignty of the Wa State, not least because it is a core institution of the military 
state and its ‘garrison‐ entrepôts’ (Roitman 2005): plantations provide radical means to 
control populations, and thus offer a core nexus between the elites of the Wa State and 
ordinary villagers – as well as with animals and plants.
What have been the effects of the plantation economy on concepts of potency and 
the good life among the Wa? In the past, the ecology of swidden cultivation and hunting 
in the highlands of Southeast Asia was generally accompanied by animistic worldviews 
and political arrangements that emphasised autonomy, mutuality and incommensura-
bility. Even though possibly there have been similarities between the worldviews of the 
valleys and the hills (Tooker 1996), one classic contrast is between the limitless potency 
of the highlands and delimited power in the valleys: whereas in the highlands, political, 
economic and ritual systems remain open in principle, in the valleys there are clear bor-
ders and restrictions in each realm. If we understand ‘potency’ as the horizon of possi-
ble action, it was limitless in the open system of the uplands, and delimited in the fixed 
frameworks and insurmountable inequalities of the lowlands (Tannenbaum 1989). This 
opposition of different forms of potency is part of a long series of contrasts between 
the highlands and the lowlands of Southeast Asia, in terms of their ecology, religion, 
politics as well as kinship arrangements (Leach 1954; Kirsch 1973; Durrenberger 1981; 
Russell 1989). The pioneers of the plantation economy in the Wa State have turned 
these oppositions on their head: former highlanders, they now rule over the lowlands.
The schemes that Nicola Tannenbaum, Thomas Kirsch and many others have used 
to describe the differences between lowland and highland Southeast Asia have been 
suggested for a world that had not yet been connected by roads, air travel, modern 
weapons, chemicals and social media. In fact, it seems the opposition between highland 
and lowland ecology only holds as long as those modern technologies are not present 
– a point that James Scott also has insisted on in the introduction to his acclaimed book 
on The art of not being governed (2009). But what happened to the opposition between 
highland and lowland ecologies after the introduction of modern technologies?
The machines and technologies of the plantation obviously make a huge differ-
ence. Plantations require technical assemblages that make plants, animals and humans 
‘legible’, that is, uniform, visible and therefore manipulable. The rubber plantations of 
the Wa State, for instance, rely on saplings brought from other plantations, chainsaws, 
and machines for rubber processing. More fundamentally, they rely on fundamental 
capacities of statecraft to make populations legible, so as to resettle, dispossess and 
exploit. In the Wa State, all these investments cannot be separated from the income 
provided by the drug economy.
In this article, I briefly introduce the history of militarism and dispossession that 
form the background for the plantation economy today. Revolutionary changes in the 
technologies of transport, communication and production have led to local politics that 
are a far cry from the classical oppositions between egalitarian uplands and hierarchical 
lowlands. The pioneers of the plantation economy have not simply adopted lowland 
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models, but instead have created a new ‘economy of life’ that is premised on the violent 
capture of local populations and their submission into a plantation economy, as well as 
the harnessing and care of the same populations. This includes human populations, as 
well as animal and plant populations: by ‘economy of life’ I mean an economy that cen-
tres on the capture and care of life, be it human, animal or plant life, as well as the tech-
nologies of capture and care.3 Such a formulation allows us to include radically different 
beings, as well as pay attention to the specific modalities and actions of each of them: in 
our case, the people, machines, plants and animals that take part in the plantation econ-
omy. Within such economies of life, potencies emerge and encounter their limitations. 
‘Potency’ refers to the horizons of action that are given in particular cosmo‐ technological 
frameworks, that is, the uses of technology that are embedded in specific social and cos-
mological practice. The main purpose of this article is to describe the contours of the 
current economies of life in the Wa hills and the potencies that emerge within them; 
building on earlier outlines of potency in highland Southeast Asia (especially that of 
Tannenbaum), I will also briefly reflect on the new limits potency comes up against; that 
is, the limits of growth in a militarised frontier region of Southeast Asia today.
T h e  h i s t o r y  o f  m i l i t a r i s m
The Wa of Southeast China and Northwest Myanmar have been typical Zomians: 
until the 1960s, most ethnic Wa lived in fortified villages independent of the sur-
rounding states. Even though Chinese armies, miners and missionaries had entered 
the Wa hills previously, most of the people in the central Wa hills lived beyond the 
reach of state administrations and world religions. Swidden cultivation remained 
the mainstay of local livelihoods into the 20th century, and before the arrival of 
Baptist missionaries in the 1930s, no Wa script existed.
In China, the Wa lost their autonomy soon after the establishment of the People’s 
Republic, whereas on the other side of the newly established international border, 
Wa communities followed local strongmen who were supported by foreign armies 
(including the People’s Liberation Army, the Kuomintang, the Tatmadaw and the 
CIA). At the end of the 1960s, the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) established 
their headquarters in the Wa hills, and with Chinese support, quickly unified all the 
remaining armed groups and warlords. The CPB established lasting government 
institutions beyond the level of villages and village‐ circles, including a hierarchical 
structure of government offices and a number of schools. In the 1970s, the CPB 
built the first dirt roads – though the armies still relied on the better roads that 
existed on the Chinese side of the border for supply and transport.
3 What I call an ‘economy of life’ is similar to what Fernando Santos‐ Granero (2009) calls a ‘political 
economy of life’ in his study of slavery and war in the Americas. While Santos‐ Granero focuses 
specifically on the problem of war captives, the French anthropologist Perig Pitrou suggests a gen-
eral theoretical framework to study the emergence of life, what he calls (somewhat awkwardly) a 
‘cosmo‐ bio‐ politics’ (2016) or a ‘general pragmatics of life’ (Pitrou 2014). Pitrou highlights how 
actions (of humans, animals, plants and spirits) are coordinated to create ‘agentive configurations 
proper to life’ (Pitrou 2014: 102). I understand both as revivals of a classical anthropological project, 
namely the unified analysis of the biological, political and cosmological arrangements that allow 
‘life’ to emerge – fundamentally similar to the attempts by Frazer and Hocart, for instance, to under-
stand the articulation of kinship and kingship.
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During the two decades of rule of the Communist Party of Burma, a small group 
of Wa soldiers rose through the ranks and two of them – Tax Pang (Bao Youxiang) 
and Tax Lai (Zhao Nilai) – became deputy brigade commanders and members of the 
politburo of the CPB in the 1980s. Unlike most of their peers, Tax Pang and Tax Lai 
had been to Chinese schools across the border. Since they had entered the CPB in 
the early 19670s, they had spent considerable time away from their home villages, 
together with Chinese, Burmese, Lahu and Shan soldiers. The lingua franca in the 
CPB during the 1970s and 80s was Chinese, given that much of the manpower, 
machinery and technology was supplied by China. But the support from China 
started to fade soon after the high tides of the Cultural Revolution (1968– 71), and 
the army units of the CPB had to find alternative sources of revenue. Given local 
industries and trade were negligibly small, opium soon became the main source of 
income: at first, through the taxation of the opium trade, and soon also by oversee-
ing large‐ scale opium transports to the Thai border. Army commanders of the CPB 
started to collaborate with local middlemen and representatives of other armies in 
the region. Particularly influential traders came from Nanpaklin, a village of Wa 
originally from Aishuai in China, who had fled the Communist Armies in the 1950s 
and settled across the Salween, near Mount Loi Maw. The leaders of Nanpaklin, the 
brothers Tax Sah and Tax Tao, and their business partner Wei Mingcheng and his son 
Wei Xuegang, quickly became important middlemen, being fluent in Chinese and 
Wa as well as having strong connections both in China and in Burma, and across the 
the entire region that came to be called the ’Golden Triangle’.
The same commanders, Tax Lai and Tax Pang, led a mutiny against the Burmese 
leadership of the CPB and established the United Wa State Army (UWSA) in 1989. 
These men, and their extended families, have since then amassed substantial per-
sonal wealth. As mentioned, some of this wealth came from opium taxes, and later 
involvement in the production and trade of narcotics. But today the Wa elites have 
diverse business portfolios with substantial investments in mining, gemstones, real 
estate as well as a series of other industries in the Wa State and in the region.
Opium had been produced in the Wa hills for at least a century, providing Wa 
farmers with some cash income. In the best times of opium production, in the 1980s 
and 1990s, most of the area suitable for opium was used for this crop. Small‐ scale 
farmers obviously did not benefit from the profits made in the opium trade and 
later in the production of heroin. These were monopolised by some business groups 
that had emerged from the marooned KMT and CCP armies in the region, and later 
collaborated with the CPB and other armed groups. The CPB at first only taxed the 
opium farmers and traders, but soon also got involved in the opium trade, and CPB 
commanders organised large mule caravans transporting raw opium to traders in the 
Golden Triangle.
After 1989, the UWSA quickly established itself as one of the strongest armed 
groups in Burma. For most of the 1990s, it maintained good relations with the 
Burmese military government, which it supported against Khun Sa’s Mengtai Army, 
then the most powerful armed group in the Golden Triangle. After defeating Khun 
Sa, the UWSA occupied some of the areas that had belonged to his army at the 
Thai Border, and forcefully resettled about 120,000 people from the Wa hills at the 
Chinese border to this new ‘Southern Command’. The Southern Command is effec-
tively led by Wei Xuegang, the long‐ time business associate from Nanpaklin who 
later also joined the UWSA. Since the establishment of the Southern Command, 
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the UWSA has not taken part in open battle, but in various smaller skirmishes with 
some of the surrounding armed groups. On the basis of the military strength of 
the UWSA, the Wa leadership plays important roles in mining (Martov 2015), real 
estate, trade, transport and other businesses in the wider region. Rather than their 
business interests outside the Wa State, what interests me here is local agriculture 
and, to some extent, local industry in the Wa State.
Having grown up in villages of peasant‐ warriors themselves, the older gener-
ation of Wa leaders all invested in farms and plantations in their home villages or 
elsewhere, once they had the wherewithal to do so. Many of them own huge farms, 
with granaries that appear grotesque in size when compared to the much smaller 
granaries of ordinary farmers. In Taoh Mie, the home village of the head of the Wa 
government, Tax Pang, huge mansion‐ palaces and government buildings mix with 
newly built farm houses, and irrigated paddies dug into the slopes near the few 
streams. Those mansion‐ farms are surrounded by large plantations of rubber, pine 
and tea.
T h e  p l a n t a t i o n :  t r a n s p o r t ,  c o m m u n i c a t i o n ,  p r o d u c t i o n
The plantations that the elites have built are similar to commercial plantations 
across the border in China, where monocultures and cash‐ cropping have become 
increasingly common. Since the 1990s, local governments have promoted com-
mercial mono‐ cropping all over China (Steinmüller 2013: chap. 3). In some areas, 
this has led to new forms of large‐ scale agribusiness (Zhang and Donaldson 2008). 
One key challenge for investors has been to appropriate enough land for large‐ 
scale commercial agriculture. In China, agricultural capitalism is held at bay by 
communal land rights at the village level; in the Wa State there is little resembling 
formal land rights for small farmers. While the majority of the population are still 
subsistence farmers, commercial agricultural has expanded rapidly in the last two 
decades. In a small de facto state governed by an insurgent army, the dispossession 
of local populations for the purpose of large‐ scale cash cropping continued earlier 
efforts by the military states at sedentarisation and drug substitution. Until the 
1990s, many farmers in the Wa State still practised some swidden cultivation and 
relied on opium for cash income. The policies of opium substitution, in particular 
the resettlement of local populations into the Southern Command (always justified 
by local elites in terms of economic development and drug substitution), as well as 
the main substitute crop, rubber (which requires large‐ scale and long‐ term planta-
tions), provided models for the new plantation economy.
Another long‐ term development had been the government push against swid-
den agriculture and the introduction of irrigated rice paddies. Even though the CPB 
had promoted these objectives, strong advances were made only after the establish-
ment of the UWSA in 1989.4 There is no doubt that the steep slopes in most of this 
4 Assessing the state of agriculture at the end of the 1980s, a former CPB official writes: ‘Except for 
the traditional ways of planting poppies in the winter and dry rice in spring, there were no cash 
crops, let alone any irrigated rice paddies, it was exactly the same as in the 1970s, slash‐ and‐ burn 
cultivation, the era of primitive and backwards agriculture’ (Shi 2012: 106).
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area pose clear limits to agricultural productivity, yet in the last two decades, with 
a lot of manpower, numerous rice paddies and irrigation channels have been cut 
into the hills of the Northern Command. Partly because of ideological reasons (irri-
gation being seen as a sign of progress), and partly because of increasing pressure 
on land use, local governments now strongly discourage swidden cultivation. 
Exhortations in this respect were often part of the political meetings held regularly 
by the district government of Taoh Mie (where I did fieldwork).
Additionally, plantations were facilitated by the huge changes in the Wa State’s 
transport network. In the last two decades, tarmac roads have been built connecting 
Nandeng, Mengmao, Pang Hsang and Meng Pok, Taoh Mie and Sao Pha ‐ the major 
towns of the Northern Command. Many of the dirt roads have been improved and 
can now be easily used by large trucks – critical for transporting hardware as well 
as harvested products – and people.
At the same time, modern technologies of communication are readily available 
even to ordinary people in the Wa State, and many people own mobile phones. 
During the 1970s and 80s, the CPB made huge efforts in building a military tele-
graph network, but even so, the communist guerrillas often relied on Chinese help 
– on the Chinese side, the telegraph networks were always more reliable and a tele-
phone network was already established in the 1980s. Since the 2000s, the Chinese 
mobile phone grid has been extended into most of the neighbouring areas of the 
Wa State. Even though on all maps, the Wa State is part of the Union of Myanmar, 
the mobile phone network of the Northern Wa State today is mainly that of China 
Mobile and China Unicom.
Related to these technological innovations in transport and communication, are 
the new technologies of production, often connected to particular machines – such 
as SUVs and trucks, cement mixers, conveyors, ventilators and ovens. All these 
machines are used in the rubber and tea plantations of the Wa State; additionally, 
the plantations rely on the technology used in the down‐ side production chains 
(often situated on the Chinese side of the border).
The technologies of transport, communication and production that made the plan-
tations possible were adopted over the course of two generations in the Wa hills, and 
have become essential mediators between humans, plants and spirits. As such, these 
technologies are essential elements of the contemporary ‘economy of life’, that is, the 
capture and care of various classes of beings. Technology does not determine the shape 
of this economy – obviously roads, mobile phones and tractors can be used for all 
kinds of purposes. But specific technologies create specific possibilities and specific 
constraints for social actions and for social relations. The point is perhaps most obvi-
ous when we compare it with the absence of technology in the classical arguments 
made about the opposition between highland and lowland society in this part of the 
world: the formalisation of kinship systems that Leach (1954) and Kirsch (1973) pro-
posed, the evolutions of ‘Asiatic’ social formations that Friedman (1998 [1979]) out-
lines and the anarchic spirit of Zomia’s ‘escape formations’ (Scott 2009) are only 
possible in the absence of SUVs, AK47s and mobile phones. Instead, those vintage 
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arguments rely on the presupposition of a shared and relatively ‘simple’ level of tech-
nology; if this assumption was contestable in the past, it is untenable today.5
To understand the new economies that have appeared in the Wa Hills since the 
1970s in general, and the plantation in particular, in the next section I look at the local 
appropriation of these technologies and the new possibilities they opened up; tech-
nologies of transport, communication and production entered into feedback cycles 
with social arrangements, specifically with local kinship. These feedback cycles can be 
seen clearly in the labour arrangements at the plantation: the plantations required large 
numbers of labourers to be available nearby. This was made possible by the break‐ up 
of local village communities through large‐ scale forced resettlement programmes, all 
done with the help of the aforementioned technologies.
K i n s h i p ,  c a p t u r e  a n d  c a r e
Plantations rely on radical measurements of legibility, imposed both on plants and 
on people. Plants are planted en masse and in line, all of the same variety and species. 
Hybrid seeds, pesticides and herbicides are generally produced by large multination-
als and planters buy them on markets. People are frequently resettled to make space 
for plantations and to supply the labour force required on the plantations. In the Wa 
State, as elsewhere in Southeast Asia, labour regimes combine free and unfree labour 
(Murray Li 2017), and land enclosures correspond to different ‘regimes of disposses-
sion’ (Levien 2013). The new labour arrangements of the plantation are based on social 
technologies of kinship that emerged in population movements, voluntary and forced.
Since the 1950s, many Wa villagers fled incoming armies and migrated elsewhere. 
Under the leadership of millenarian prophets and local warlords, some villagers 
escaped into areas east of the Salween, and others went to the Golden Triangle proper, 
closer to the Thai border. During the high tide of the Cultural Revolution in China, 
numerous Wa from China went across the new international border and settled in the 
areas controlled by the Communist Party of Burma. Even though most of these village 
groups followed some local leaders, these movements were not centrally organised 
by government. This changed in the 1990s, when the new military government of the 
UWSA forcefully resettled a large part of the Wa population. As mentioned above, 
after the victory over Khun Sa in 1996, the UWSA resettled about 120,000 villagers to 
5 Whether ecology and technology could be understood as ‘external’ to a systemic understanding of 
the upland– lowland contrast was of course a main point of contestation in those earlier debates. 
Nugent (1982), for instance, had pointed out that Leach’s model of an oscillation based on matri-
lateral cross‐ cousin marriage was only possible by ignoring the economic history of the region, and 
specifically the opium trade. Friedman’s (1998 [1979]) structural Marxist model is based on notions 
of yield, carrying power, population density and the like; altogether he aimed at including ecology 
and technology into a much larger system of social production for which he offered mathematical 
formulae. Scott (2009), finally, is very clear that his theory of ‘escape formations’ ends with the 
introduction of modern transport. Fiskesjö (2010) summarises some of these arguments in relation-
ship to the Wa chiefs and offers corresponding explanations for why such chiefs ultimately did not 
promote the creation of stable and centralised government. None of them, however, explicitly prob-
lematises and theorises the technological constraints under which these models of political change 
were possible: constraints of transport (by foot, mule or truck), communication (oral, literate or 
electronic) and production (by knife, hoe or machine).
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the new Southern Command at the Thai border (LNDO 2002). At the same time, the 
military government also actively arranged resettlements in the Northern Command, 
trying to concentrate settlements along the new roads and plantations that were built 
at the same time.
About 200 of the 500 households in the village of Yaong Rai, for instance, were 
resettled to the Southern Command at the Thai border in the 1990s. Some of them 
received their own plots in the new villages in the Southern Command, but many oth-
ers work in rubber plantations or at the houses of commanders. One commander, Li 
Lao’er, who is originally from Yaong Rai, also has established several rubber planta-
tions near the capital Pang Hsang, and tea and pine plantations in Yaong Rai. During 
my fieldwork, the entourage of this commander in his mansions in Pang Hsang and 
in Yaong Rai included about 30 workers with their families, most of them relatives 
or neighbours from Yaong Rai. Additionally, the village headman sometimes ordered 
co‐ villagers to work on the plantations of this commander in Yaong Rai, as part of the 
regular compulsory labour villagers have to do.
Backed up by his own personal wealth and his rank in the military hierarchy, the 
gap between Li Lao’er and the villagers of Yaong Rai is huge. In fact, the emergence of 
this new elite of the military state has also created a new form of association – the fol-
lowing of a commander – that cancels out any egalitarian effect the earlier kinship 
arrangements might have had. Ethnic Wa traditionally marry according to a system of 
patrilateral cross‐ cousin marriage, which does not establish a permanent distinction 
between wife‐ givers and wife‐ takers. Instead the wife‐ givers of one generation are the 
wife‐ takers of the next generation.6 Even though cross‐ cousin marriage is still common 
today, village‐ level marriage is now much less important as a core social alliance than it 
was in the past. Younger commanders generally do not choose their marriage partner 
according to custom and might only pay ceremonial attention to the role of the uncle 
(pao, that is, the father’s sister’s husband for a boy and the mother’s brother for a girl), 
who traditionally had to be asked for permission before marriage.
For poor villagers, whether marriage partners are cross‐ cousins is now much 
less important than whether or not they can claim some relationship with a powerful 
patron. Some villagers might thus send their children to the army, or to the house of 
a commander, whereas other children are forecefully captured. The followers often 
work on the estates of the elite: children stay in the mansions and help as servants, 
6 It is important to note that patrilateral (bilateral) cross‐ cousin marriage is fundamentally different 
from the matrilateral cross‐ cousin marriage that was at the centre of Leach’s and Kirsch’s arguments 
about the oscillation of egalitarian and hierarchical systems in Southeast Asia. In the matrilateral 
cross‐ cousin systems, there is a tendency towards the establishment and long‐ term differentiation 
(and thus emergence of hierarchy) between groups of wife‐ givers and wife‐ takers. This tendency 
was crucial in the ideal‐ type theory of oscillation between relatively egalitarian gumlao and rel-
atively hierarchical gumsa arrangements in Leach’s analysis of Kachin society (1954), as well as 
Kirsch’s culturalist reformulation of the same oppositions in terms of cultural values, such as ‘ritual 
efficacy’ and ‘potency’ (1973). In patrilateral systems, the ‘wife‐ takers’ of the last generation are the 
‘wife‐ givers’ of this generation, and therefore there is little chance for ‘chiefly lineages’ to differ-
entiate themselves from others – this is the reason why such systems were commonly called ‘sym-
metric exchange systems’. The kinship system in general, and matrilateral cross‐ cousin marriage in 
particular, for Leach and Kirsch became a formalised system, through which an essentialised logic 
(of rational power for Leach, and symbolic power for Kirsch) realised itself. Such arguments could 
only work within certain ecological constraints, that is, in the absence of modern technologies of 
transport, communication and production.
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whereas able‐ bodied men and women work on plantations. The social logic that con-
nects elites and commoners is a logic of capture and care: it relies on the new acquain-
tances created in the military and the networks of patronage formed on their basis; 
but it also requires anonymity and the rejection of (potential) mutuality. These four 
elements (acquaintances, patronage, anonymity and the rejection of mutuality) allow 
for the exercise of capture and care. While capture and care have always been import-
ant in Wa kinship, together with the expansion of militarism (including the plantation 
economies described above), the scopes and scales of these logics have changed very 
much. They are now, fundamentally, the logics that tie up the village with the military 
state, through an extension and an expansion of kinship.
Elsewhere I have described in detail those personal dynamics of capture and care: 
children are often literally ‘captured’, that is, forcefully recruited into army units 
(Steinmüller 2019; Steinmüller n.d.). Violent recruitment is made possible on the basis 
of personal networks of acquaintance and patronage formed in army units, and on the 
basis of the anonymity of villagers and the rejection of potential mutuality with the 
victims of capture. This whole apparatus of capture is counter‐ balanced by the exercise 
of care: concretely, that is, the protection, support and mutuality of army commanders 
toward their followers. Children that are press‐ ganged in such ways sometimes grow 
to become ‘right hands’ of their commander, and might even become commanders in 
their own right.
The socio‐ logics of capture and care not only connect individual army command-
ers with the children in their mansions, but extend between the army elite as a whole 
and entire local populations, specifically when it comes to the institution of the plan-
tation: commanders, such as Li Lao’er (mentioned above), in collaboration with local 
headmen, have ordered villagers to cede their fields and slopes for the creation of plan-
tations; or on an even larger scale, order and manage the resettlement of entire vil-
lages (as they have done in the resettlement campaigns following the conquest of the 
so‐ called Southern Command at the Thai border). Such ‘capture’ of local populations 
is often accompanied by some measure of care for the same populations: for instance, 
followers are provided with housing, often built in uniform style as newly ‘planned 
villages’, sometimes even with local schools, and some social support in emergencies.
The labour regime in local plantations in the Northern Wa State combines the 
corvée labour of local populations, the free labour of household members and some 
paid labour for foremen and skilled workers, with corvée labour constituting the 
largest part. Commanders can mobilise this labour directly, when villagers have been 
resettled next to their new rubber plantations. In the process of resettlement, villagers 
commonly receive some support to build houses, for instance, building material and 
cooking utensils, and during the first few years in the resettlement camps are allocated 
a standard ratio of rice per household. In turn, villagers regularly have to work in 
the plantations. Work schedules here are commonly organised by local headmen and 
village clerks; even though such labour arrangements are far from transparent and gen-
erally do not take the form of wage labour, they are still measured in terms of quantity 
(hours, days, numbers of workers), and often lists are used by foremen and scribes.
Aside from the plantation itself, another core arena in which relations of capture 
and care have evolved from earlier kinship arrangements is the sacrificial feast. In the 
transformations of feasting, and specifically the lavish feasts that take place at the man-
sions of the commanders, the emerging horizons of potency can be seen most clearly.
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Fe a s t i n g  t o d a y
Traditionally, all important sacrifices and rituals in Wa villages were accompanied by 
large feasts. The feasting economy corresponded to cycles of ritual exchange, which are 
inter‐ connected with the wider ecology and have been studied extensively in Southeast 
Asia. Kirsch (1973), Lehman (1989), Tannenbaum (1989) and others have suggested 
that feasting cycles were a crucial platform of sharing and distribution through which 
hierarchies could emerge. No matter whether the emergence of hierarchy was con-
ceptualised as a consequence of ambiguities within upland arrangements of rank and 
kinship, or of external economic pressures, all of these frameworks suggest a clear 
opposition between uplands and lowlands: that is, a broadly egalitarian system in the 
highlands, in which all players can be sponsors and recipients of feasting, and a hier-
archical system in the lowlands, with clear differences between rich and poor, and 
between different ranks. ‘As Tannenbaum puts it succinctly, ‘[whereas] in the uplands 
system, potency and power were directly linked to production and participation in 
society, in the lowlands, power could be accessed through restraint and withdrawal or 
dependency on more powerful others’ (Tannenbaum 1989: 81).
Traditional Wa feasting broadly corresponds to the upland type in this opposition. 
In the past, important occasions for feasting were village openings, the construction of 
bridges, as well as headhunting and tiger hunts. At a smaller scale, the inaugurations 
of houses and granaries, as well as life‐ cycle rituals, harvest and hunting, were accom-
panied by sacrifices and feasting. In all these rituals it was fundamentally important 
to deal in appropriate ways with potentially capricious ancestors, spirits and species‐ 
owners. Most of these rituals are still held at village level and are always accompanied 
by shared meals.
But now there are also large‐ scale sacrifices and banquets organised by the com-
manders of the military state. The members of the Wa elite today support churches and 
temples, and give donations to infrastructure projects (such as memorials, bridges and 
government buildings). As part of such sponsorship, they hold huge feasts and ban-
quets. Even more lavish than these ‘public events’ are the celebrations for the weddings 
of the sons and daughters of the elites. In 2017, for instance, a three‐ day wedding was 
held for the daughter of the head of the Wa administration, Tax Pang. According to 
local gossip, there were 3000 tables (of eight guests each), and three nights of celebra-
tions in the capital Pang Hsang included performances by several pop stars from China 
and Taiwan.
Some commanders also hold large‐ scale buffalo sacrifices in their home villages. 
In 2015, for instance, I attended a buffalo sacrifice held by Ai Lun, a member of the 
politburo of the United Wa State Party, in his home village. At the occasion, 15 buffalos 
were slaughtered, and hundreds of guests hosted, including relatives and neighbours, 
colleagues from government and army, as well as business associates from afar.
It is difficult to assess the motivations of commanders in sacrificing so many buf-
falos and inviting so many guests. Possibly one reason is simply that they can do it: 
resources are concentrated in the hands of commanders. There might be also an element 
of competition between members of the elite, who strive for rank and prestige. Yet, 
people only rarely make comparisons between the feasts and estates of high‐ ranking 
commanders, and each leader seems to stand out as a single personality when seen from 
the perspective of commoners. The number of tables at Tax Pang’s house, the buffalos 
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at Ai Lun’s house, as well as the cars of their children, the wealth in their storehouses 
and the size of their plantations – all this betrays new levels of insatiability.
In the feasting cycles of yore, no one could stand out, because everyone had the 
same access to resources and no monopoly could emerge. While the upland system 
was open in principle, it was limited by the life‐ force of each player – fundamentally, 
the constraints imposed by every player’s exhaustion. Today, there are insurmountable 
differences between the elites and the commoners, specifically in access to technolo-
gies (of transport, communication and production), storage of resources and command 
over followers in estates. For most people, this is a closed system, and potencies are 
limited by one’s position within the system. But for a small elite, the system remains 
open and they actively explore the possibilities of limitless potency.
The elites of the Wa State thus play a peculiar role in the new economy of life: 
their aspirations to potency were acquired in an older upland economy, yet they are 
realised on top of the plunder and exploitation made possible by garrisons, mansions 
and plantations. Even so, their aspirations also encounter limitations. The limits to the 
potency of every being are given by the constraints of the economy of life: that is, the 
actions possible (and impossible) within the organic configurations and technological 
modalities of capture and care.
Ordinary people are part of those arrangements of capture and care, often as 
objects but also sometimes as subjects. Even though they engage on equal terms with 
some of their relatives and neighbours, they frequently encounter limitations: there 
is not much forest left in the Wa State today, land is scarce and access to resources is 
extremely unequal. Most villagers have very few possessions and little place for storage.
The elites, in contrast, have accumulated lots of resources, have built huge man-
sions and have many followers. Beyond that, they have privileged access to land, via 
the new technologies of transport, communication and production. They still define 
themselves by their ‘pioneering spirit’, that is, by the ordinary ambitions of peasant‐ 
warriors of the past, which included opening up land, capturing enemies and hosting 
followers. But even so, their (potentially limitless) ambitions encounter limits in the 
obstinacy of others, including humans, plants, animals and objects: not all hills are 
suitable for specific plants, for instance. Even though the dispossession of local popu-
lations has been extremely successful and has encountered little direct resistance, ordi-
nary people, sometimes at least, resist the work disciplines on the plantations and other 
impositions. Given the lack of other avenues, they might simply run away – which 
indeed they do quite frequently.
C o n c l u s i o n :  t h e  l i m i t s  o f  g r o w t h ?
Modern technologies of production and communication have transformed the eco-
logical frameworks within which potency and agency operate. I have highlighted here 
in particular transport, communication and agricultural production. The focus on the 
importance of modern technology should not blind us to the fact that technological 
mediation always played a role – including in the Wa economy of life prior to the 
arrival of modern transport, communication and production. Thus technologies such 
as swidden cultivation also imposed certain constraints onto aspirations to potency, 
even though the ‘upland system [was] essentially open’ (Tannenbaum 1989: 80). In 
Tannenbaum’s analysis, potential competitors in the uplands all had similar access to 
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resources, and ‘the recipients of today’s generosity [were] likely to be the sponsors of 
tomorrow’s’ (1989: 81). Thus, potency in the uplands did not immediately encoun-
ter limitations in the rules and measurements imposed in everyday discourse (present 
in the lowlands specifically in the monks’ precincts and in the incomparably greater 
potency of the elite). Instead, all forms of potency only encountered their limits in the 
fatigue of each agent: my host, Headman Nap, often told me about the ways in which 
people worked the land in the past. As he remembered it, in the old days, people just 
worked until they got tired and then stopped (especially in swidden cultivation). But 
today, people work as long and as hard as they are able to, at any rate, longer than they 
would like to. That is the new work ethic that inspires not only the backbreaking toil 
on plantations, but also, and especially, the farmers’ work on their own plots, specif-
ically on irrigated rice paddies: preparing irrigation channels and harvesting rice no 
doubt require more intense work and more cooperation than planting and harvesting 
tubers.
Headman Nap’s comments correspond to the opposition between agricultural 
work and industrial labour; the latter being work ‘against the clock’, that is, an effort 
that is constantly measured (Thompson 1967). Work in the Wa State today is still not 
measured by the clock, though – at least not the majority of plantation labour and 
farm work. But there are other measurements and comparisons constantly imposed on 
people. The technologies of statecraft, for instance, introduce clear property divisions 
of household and land (at least in principle, and when compared to the past). Even 
more than in the peasant economies of the village, in the large plantations, resources are 
constantly measured, bought and sold: seeds, plants, plots and people are all numbered 
and counted on a daily basis.
The limitations commoners encounter on an everyday basis in these regards con-
trast with the experience of the elite. For some members of the elite, ‘money is not 
an issue’ and in consequence they have become insatiable and make huge displays of 
their wealth, including in the feasts that they host at their houses. Compared with 
the relatively humble lives of commoners, the elites know few constraints. Such con-
straints exist nevertheless, for instance, in the obstinacy of matter – not everything can 
be done to the mountain slopes and plants in this region – and in the resistance of local 
populations.
Superficially, it appears that the lowlands have taken over: and the elites of the 
Wa State have moved from open forests to plains, from swidden cultivation to rice 
paddies, from animism to Buddhism, and from cross‐ cousin marriage to semi‐ feudal 
arrangements. But it is a mistake to say that these ‘pioneers of the plantation econ-
omy’ have simply adopted the lowland systems of the past. The oppositions of ecol-
ogy, religion and kinship that provided the scaffolding of countless arguments about 
highlands and lowlands relied on particular technological constraints: fundamentally, 
the absence of modern technologies of transport, communication and production. 
Understanding these technologies as ‘cosmo‐ technics’, that is, technologies that are 
adapted to local cosmologies, can provide the building blocks of a new economy of 
life. This framework thus helps us understand what happened to the limitless poten-
cies of the uplands. Such economies of life and their respective cosmo‐ technics pro-
vide the nourishing ground for the cultivation of ambitions and potencies. The same 
economies of life, however, also mark the limitations and constraints for the same 
potencies.
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Pionniers de l’économie de plantation: milita-
risme, dépossession et limites de la croissance 
dans l’État Wa du Myanmar
La mobilité caractéristique des populations des hautes terres d’Asie du Sud‐ Est repose en grande 
partie sur leur adaptation particulière à un environnement écologique: la culture des tubercules sur 
abattis-brûlis dans les régions de montagne. Cette écologie correspondait à des cosmologies dans 
lesquelles la puissance était illimitée, ou du moins n’avait pas de périmètre fixe et délimité (comme 
les rizières et les royaumes bouddhistes dans les vallées). La construction de l’État militaire, les 
transports modernes et les nouvelles cultures et technologies agricoles ont effectivement mis fin 
à la culture sur brûlis. Dans cet article, je suis les pionniers de l’économie de plantation dans 
l’État Wa du Myanmar, qui dépouillent les populations locales de leurs terres et les emploient 
comme main‐ d’oeuvre dans les plantations. Les limites de la croissance et de la puissance qu’ils 
rencontrent sont a) dans l’environnement naturel et b) dans la résistance des populations locales. 
Pourtant, même si ces limites existent, la puissance à laquelle ces pionniers aspirent est toujours 
sans limite. Elle est cependant canalisée par une nouvelle économie de la vie, incarnée par la planta-
tion, nourri en festins excessifs et entretenue par la dynamique de parenté de la capture et des soins.
Mots clés dépossession, vie, économie, plantation, Wa
